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In order to further research on decision making in social work a richer theoretical underpinning of models of decision making is required. There has been significant theoretical advance in other disciplines from which we might learn and develop supportive theoretical constructs. This paper outlines some major theoretical approaches to modelling individual judgement including expected utility, fuzzy set theory, signal detection, heuristics and biases, judgement analysis and bounded rationality models. Models are drawn from diverse fields such as computing, economics, psychology and operations research and are illustrated with social work examples. The models are sequenced from those that are more prescriptive (based on mathematical models of how a rational person should act) through to those that are more descriptive (creating models from studies of how people make decisions in real life). Implications are drawn out for future research on judgement and decision making in social work. It is time for research on social work decision making to be taken to a new level by creating and adapting models to inform empirical studies. This will require interdisciplinary collaboration and clarity in selecting, adapting and creating models appropriate to the complex environment of social work decision making.
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Decision making is of crucial importance to the social work profession. Lives and liberty depend on decisions taken in crises and high risk situations. We support clients in risk-taking decision making. Professional judgements have to be based explicitly on knowledge and sound reasoning, utilising robust assessment tools. We engage in collaborative, and sometimes contested, decision making processes. There is increasing pressure from society on professionals to be more explicit in their decision making processes (Denvall, 2008; Munro, 1999; Taylor & Campbell, 2011). It is paradoxical that in everyday life people may have little conscious awareness of how they make decisions. 

Although professional judgement and decision making are a central concern in social work practice, this is rarely a focus for research (Shaw & Norton, 2007; Taylor et al, 2010; University of Ulster, 2011). However there has been substantial research on decision making over decades in disciplines such as computing, economics, medicine, military studies, operations research and psychology. What studies there are of decision making in social work are often atheoretical (see for example Killick & Taylor, 2009 & 2012 in relation to elder abuse decisions) making it difficult to create conceptualizations to support practice and inform teaching. This paper addresses the need to develop appropriate models and theoretical constructs to support research on social work decision making (Duffy & Collins, 2010; Johnsson & Svensson, 2005). Although a front-line practitioner may make a limited range of decisions without consulting their supervisor, social workers make many recommendations that influence decisions. We consider here how we can understand, or model, the cognitive judgements of social workers in forming their recommendations, regardless of whether they act on them directly or use them to inform discussion and decision making with others. The use of a range of models of decision making may assist in conceptualising practice and in formulating research projects on this complex topic (Shaw, 2011).

For reasons of space the focus here is restricted to decisions in relation to individual clients and families, although we recognize group work and community development as part of social work. We use the typology of social work decisions developed in Taylor (2010):
o	client decisions that might be facilitated by a social worker;
o	care planning decisions involving choice between two or more options for care;
o	choice between interventions or treatments;
o	protection or safeguarding decisions on behalf of society;
o	decisions about eligibility for services; and
o	decisions to refer elsewhere or to take no action.

Consideration of interactive decision processes such as with a client, another professional or within families are beyond the scope of this paper. We omit also models of multiple decisions regarding a number of clients that impact on the provision and prioritization of social care services, where system modelling approaches (such as discrete event simulation) are appropriate. We do not consider here the time dimension, such as in series of decisions (Tsang, 2008; Taylor, 2010, ch9), changing your mind (Macdonald & Sheldon, 1998) or hindsight bias (errors commonly made in evaluating erroneous predictions after the event) which require separate treatment.

This paper focuses on individual professional judgement. The terms judgement and decision making are often used interchangeably in general discourse. Where they are to be distinguished the term judgement is used here as more widely in the international literature to mean the considered evaluation (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Evaluation" \o "Evaluation​) of evidence by an individual using their cognitive faculties so as to reach an opinion on a preferred course of action based on available information, knowledge and values (Taylor, 2010, p. 165). The term decision making is used to mean a conscious processes (individually or as a corporate exercise with one or more others) leading to the selection of a course of action among two or more alternatives (Taylor, 2010, p. 164). We do not use the term judgement in the narrow sense of a value or legal judgement. In normal usage the outcome of a decision may be a preference for a particular course of action rather than action itself. Thus the term decision making is often used in everyday contexts where researchers and theorists might use the term judgement. This paper will generally use the term decision making as it is likely to be more accessible to our audience, but will use the term judgement where it is more appropriate for clarity.

This article describes a number of models of individual judgement and considers their possible application in social work. Such models may be useful to structure research and teaching. By a model we mean a simplified representation or way of understanding something that is inherently complex or multi-dimensional. A decision model enables us to analyse decisions in relation to that model as a way of better understanding similarities and differences. This may open up ways by which one decision process might inform reflections on, and improvements in, decisions in another context.

The distinction between analytic and intuitive modes of thinking and deciding has been debated at least as long ago as Greek philosophers before the birth of Christ. The analytic and intuitive have often been thought of as dichotomous and competing modes of thought, even to the extent of describing the stable cognitive style of individuals as being one or the other. There has been some consideration of these modes of judgement in social work (Munro, 2008b; Helm, 2011). Kenneth Hammond, building on work by Egon Brunswik (1956), has proposed instead that these be considered as the two poles of a continuum of approaches to decision making, with quasi-rational approaches occupying a middle ground (Hammond, 1996). That is the approach adopted here. Analytic modes of deciding lend themselves to mathematical models of understanding whereas intuitive approaches require psychosocial models. Analytic or prescriptive approaches focus primarily on modeling how a rational person ought to make a decision, adapting this through research to accommodate what happens in practice. Intuitive or descriptive approaches start from studying how people make decisions in the real world and then seek to create a model that makes sense of this behavior and gives generalisability. In this paper relevant models of individual judgement are considered in turn. The models are sequenced, broadly speaking, using the continuum approach adopted in work by Hammond et al (1980), Doherty (1993) and Cooksey (1996). Models earlier in this sequence are generally more explicitly rational, mathematical, analytic and normative in their approach. Models later in this sequence are generally grown more from empirical evidence and are more intuitive and descriptive in approach.

Models of Individual Judgement

Expected Utility Model
The models of individual judgement that are most mathematical are those that are based on the economic principle of expected utility. They assume that people will make choices that maximise their personal benefit or gain (utility). If we know the options available and the attributes of each option then we can compute the rational judgement that should be made by combining these using weights assigned to the characteristics of the various options (Raiffa, 1968). Reflecting the economic roots of the model, utilities (values) are normally expressed in financial terms. As an example a decision about installing road safety measures on one particular road rather than another might utilise such a model balancing the costs of various safety features against the ‘cost’ of the history of accidents at that spot using figures such as those used by insurance companies for payments in relation to particular injuries or death. 

If an outcome is uncertain, the utility of that option is the assigned value multiplied by the probability of that outcome occurring. Decision trees can be developed to visualise the options available, each with their corresponding utilities and probabilities, an approach which has been explored to a limited extent in social work (Munro, 2008a). Bayes Theorem can be used to calculate a revised estimate of probability as new information becomes available (Macdonald, 2001). This is often known as decision theory in the literature, perhaps because it is the longest-established approach to research on decision making.

Subjective Expected Utility Model
A development of the expected utility model that may be relevant to social work is subjective expected utility, attributed particularly to Ward Edwards (1992). This model recognises that people do not always behave in the way that pure economic theory suggests. The utility assigned by an individual to a particular option may reflect their personal values rather than the value ascribed by an economist on a premise of maximising gain expressible in monetary terms. This is often known as behavioural decision theory reflecting the adaptation of decision theory to people’s observed behaviour. This model would be described, like the previous one, as a multi-attribute utility theory. In principle at least, each factor influencing the decision can be measured on a scale of some sort, even if this is subjective. Different factors can be given a weighting, and the decision maker reaches a conclusion by giving a utility to each alternative, comprising the relative weighting of each component multiplied by its measure on a scale representing its value. As with the basic expected utility model, where outcomes are uncertain these values are multiplied by the probability of that outcome to give the utility.

An everyday example of this model might be choosing a holiday and seeking to accommodate the differing aspects of each option that appeal to different family members. The availability of certain attractive activities (historical sites, swimming, mountain-walking) may be weighed up together with such factors as cost and travel times. The reader might like to reflect on the extent to which their own decision processes are described by this model!

In social work this model may be relevant to care planning decisions or choosing between interventions. For example an older person being discharged from hospital after a fall whilst living alone may consider various options such as home care services or a move into supported housing or residential care. The social worker might assist the older person and family in a rational process such as clarifying the level of care provided in relation to what is required, cost, privacy, ease of family visiting and so on, and helping to clarify the value placed on each of these. Some factors, such as cost, might be more readily measured whereas others, such as level of satisfaction with anticipated care, might be more subjective. 

Signal Detection Theory
The models considered above recognise that available information directly relevant to the decision (such as client, family and context factors) is less than complete. Signal detection theory takes this a step further and focuses on the challenge in identifying what information is relevant to the decision amidst the vast amount of irrelevant data (noise) present to the decision maker (Egan, 1975; Swets & Pickett, 1982). This approach has been applied in diverse fields such as identifying enemy aircraft from radar-screen blips, medical diagnosis, weather prediction and the validity of witness statements in court. The essence of the model is to consider the distribution of data when there is no signal (in child protection social work this might be, for example, when there is more settled family functioning or no abuse) and compare this with the data distribution when there is a signal (eg. when there is abuse or a period of greater family dysfunction). This is a variant approach to identifying risk factors for a particular undesirable event such as abuse.

The pioneering work of Len Dalgleish in social work might be considered within this approach (Dalgleish, 1988). If the task is to predict the likelihood of abuse then there are four options. If there is a signal (abuse) then a yes response is a hit and a no is a miss; if there is no signal (no abuse) then a response of yes is a false alarm and a no is a correct rejection (of this case leading to abuse). Dalgleish considered the influences on a social worker that might increase the likelihood of correct yes and false alarm (such as an overriding concern not to miss any instance of abuse), and the influences that might increase the likelihood of correct no and incorrect rejection (such as an overriding concern not to disrupt families where this is not warranted) (Dalgleish and Drew, 1989). Despite some progress (Parton et al, 1997; Shlonsky & Wagner, 2005; White & Walsh, 2006; Hollows, 2008) there is scope to take this work further. One example might be to use large data sets to provide models of individual and family functioning where there has and has not been an identified problem, and to use these to develop our ability to correctly identify relevant signals. This is a particularly important issue in child and adult protection services, but the model can also be applied to correctly identifying instances of other undesirable events such as re-admission to hospital, self-neglect or suicide.

Judgement Analysis
Judgement analysis traces its origins to the pioneering work of Austrian psychologist Egon Brunswik (1956) who tried to capture the probabilistic relationship between an individual and their environment. Brunswik recognised that we do not have fully accurate information about our environment on which to base our decisions. We take in cues to create a mental model that represents the real world (as we perceive it) and use that model to inform our judgement process. The model, as developed further by Kenneth Hammond (1996), recognises an interaction between the person making the judgement and their environment, rather than treating the decision maker as having the objectivity of being independent and isolated from such influences. 

Judgement analysis helps us to understand (model) how people take cognizance of probabilistic information in relation to making a decision (Hoffman, 1960). Multiple regression equations may be used to express the influence (rather than determination) of factors on the decision outcome (Hursch et al 1964). The model is suited to studying professional judgements, describing the effect of multiple cues with an equation which gives each a weight representing its influence (Benbenishty, 1992). This model is relevant to social work in that we are regularly tasked with drawing inferences about intangible events (such as severity of possible future abuse) based on a number of indicators such as medical diagnosis, evaluation of social circumstances and a range of information derived from family members and other professionals and care workers. To date most work utilising judgement analysis has focused on modelling the judgements of individuals, although some research in social work has sought to model the judgements of groups or classes of decision makers utilising the factorial survey method (Taylor, 2006a; Taylor & Zeller, 2007; Wallander, 2009). With this model standard linear regression and analysis of variance (ANOVA) may be used.

Fuzzy Decision Theory
It could be argued (Zadeh et al, 1975) that human judgements involve dealing with ill-defined factors and values rather than the precise data required in the above models. Fuzzy decision theory considers decision making in terms of categories with imprecise membership, and uncertainty in terms of possibility (whether the event can happen) rather than probability (whether it will happen). In this model imprecise information is represented by membership of fuzzy categories, and processes are represented by fuzzy operators rather than the precise algebra of utility models. This model uses the mathematics of fuzzy set theory to provide insight into judgements (Smithson, 1987).

In relation to social work one might regard the pioneering work of Paul Brearley (1982) as within this approach. He developed concepts of trigger (or precipitating) factors (situations that may precipitate the occurrence of an identified undesirable event) and vulnerability (or predisposing factors) (the susceptibility of an individual to suffer from an identified undesirable event) (see Taylor, 2010, p166). These are not defined, measured or manipulated in a precise mathematical way as in the expected utility models above, but nonetheless assist in conceptualizing types of risk and their interactions. There is scope to explore the usefulness of fuzzy decision theory approaches to the analytic stage of decisions where concepts such as those developed by Brearley are combined in a more explicit, modelled way to reach a judgement. 

Heuristics and Biases
With the vast amount of information and knowledge potentially available to influence a decision, a major task for the human brain is to select and use the most relevant information. The heuristics and biases approach focuses on how people create informal short-cuts (known as decision rules or heuristics) that enable the brain to process large amounts of information efficiently. Such heuristics are also potential biases, since a person may give undue or insufficient attention to particular information compared to a more rational decision maker or by comparison to a consensus of relevant people (such as fellow professionals in our case). This approach is associated particularly with Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky and Paul Slovic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) who crystallised concepts such as anchoring bias (misjudgement due to the reference points used) and representativeness bias (misjudgement due to an overemphasis on readily available data, or how easily an example can be brought to mind).

Heuristics and biases have been studied in relation to a number of professions (see e.g. Chapman and Elstein, 2000, in relation to medicine). In relation to social work this approach is relevant given the diverse information that must be considered including public and organisational policies, societal and local culture, and professional knowledge as well as the incomplete (and potentially biased) information available about the particular client, family and social context (Benbenishty et al., 2011). The predisposition of an individual social worker to be more risk-averse or risk-taking (Taylor, 2006b) might be analysed in terms of this being a useful heuristic in the face of complex information and simultaneously a potential bias. Similarly the social worker’s values, experiences, confidence and personal characteristics might influence judgements, and might be considered within this model (Fox Harding, 1997; Banks, 2006; Clark, 2006; Smith, 2010; Houston et al, 2011). Analysis using this modelling highlights the importance of the traditional strength in social work of supervision and the emphasis on reflective practice whereby human biases may be identified and addressed. In the context of decision making, one could regard reflective practice as a model for seeking to avoid bias and ensuring appropriate choice of heuristics (Darragh & Taylor, 2008). For a list of heuristics and biases see Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​List_of_cognitive_biases​)) and for a list adapted for relevance to social work see Taylor (2010, p64). 

Bounded Rationality Model (Aspiration Adaptation Theory)
The bounded rationality model has been developed particularly by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). This model is based on the premise that decision makers do not have unlimited information, time or resources. Hence in reality people use simple but effective heuristics (mental processes) to deal with complex decisions rather than seeking to compute vast amounts of data regarding every option as suggested by the most rational analytic models above (Dawes, 1979). Bounded rationality does not refer to irrational behaviour (such as consulting a horoscope) or models that take into account the cost of retrieving information as part of an overall expected utility model of optimising the value of the outcome using detailed information on each option. Rather, bounded rationality focuses on decision making in terms of three types of processes:
1.	simple search rules to gain the information required to make the decision;
2.	simple stopping rules for when to discontinue searching for further information; and
3.	simple decision rules such as the option that is favoured by the most important reason.
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002)
By contrast to bounded rationality, the expected utility models described above generally ignore the task of seeking or gathering information for the decision, and take it as a given that consideration of more relevant factors will lead to a better decision.

An example to illustrate the model is to consider the task of making a robot that can catch a ball that is being thrown. On a pure mathematical model the robot would be programmed to compute the position, speed, spin and angle of travel of the ball in order to decide where to go to catch it. It would require an enormous amount of data on such factors as throwing force and wind speed, and would have to process this information very rapidly in order for the robot to then move to a position to catch a ball. By comparison a bounded rationality model (McLeod & Dienes, 1996) suggests that a more effective simple heuristic that a human (perhaps) uses is simply to judge the angle at which the ball is approaching, and to move so as to keep that angle constant so as to be in position when it approaches the ground.

An early example of bounded rationality was the satisficing model developed by Herbert Simon (1956) which suggested that, under constraints of time and resources, decision makers select the first good enough option that they find. The application of this to social work in a context such as an out-of-hours crisis is apparent. I can well remember being called out by the police in the early hours of the morning to visit a house where two young children had been left unattended. My decision was not based on seeking out and appraising every possible option. Rather I probably used some decision rule (see bounded rationality rule type 3 above) such as seek a family member to care for the child if possible.  Having found grandparents who were willing to looking after the children overnight, and in relation to whom there were no obvious barriers, such as on information held by the police or the social work team, I ceased my search for a solution (see rule type 2 above) rather than undertaking a comprehensive kinship fostering assessment. This model might lend itself to modelling assessment and knowledge use by social workers in some contexts, considering the processes of gathering information rather than disregarding the effort required to gather knowledge as in many other models (Munro, 2008b).

This concept of a good enough outcome of a decision is termed an aspiration level within the bounded rationality model, and this aspiration level itself is viewed as being adjusted to the circumstances. Thus decisions are modelled as influenced both by the individual decision maker and also by the environment. Information search processes are viewed as being of two types: (1) searching for options (as in the satisficing example above), or (2) searching for cues about reasons for preferring one option to another, now known as fast and frugal approaches. A good bounded rationality model is regarded as being: (1) plausible in terms of human psychology; (2) specific to a particular domain (environment) of decision making; and (3) rational in terms of the environment within which the decision maker is operating, such as social norms and emotions (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Heuristics are viewed here as rational adaptive processes in relation to the decision environment, rather than being viewed as biases inhibiting an omniscient, rational judgement.

Image Theory
One well-developed model within descriptive approaches to decision study is image theory which has been pioneered particularly by Lee Roy Beach and Terence Mitchell (1987). The main premise is that decision makers represent information in their mental processes as images. In its present form the model has three successive stages of image: the value image, the trajectory image and the strategic image. The value image contains the person’s beliefs and values; the trajectory image contains the person’s vision for their life goals, consistent with their value image; and the strategic image contains their plans and practical tactics, consistent with their life goals. 

A key premise of the model is that a decision maker uses successive images only if the decision is not made by considering only the earlier image(s) (Beach & Connolly, 2005). Thus the decision may be settled on the basis of my values (image one). For example St Thomas More (who was beheaded by King Henry VIII in 1535 for refusing to accede to the King’s plan to annul his marriage to his wife in order to marry a chambermaid) might be regarded as making his decision using only the first image, his deeply-held values. However if there remains a choice after considering the decision in terms of the first image, the second image is used. This second image - consideration of my life goals - may be sufficient to make the decision. For example if the choice of advertisements for jobs includes only two that fit with my vision for my life in terms of location, even though more job openings than that are acceptable in terms of my values, then the second image will be used to make the choice to apply only to these two. If the second image still leaves me with a choice I will use the third image: what tactics will I use (image three) to achieve this life goal (image two), which is underpinned by my beliefs and values (image one).

As a model for social work this might be useful for seeking to understand the decisions of clients and families (cf. Department of Health, 2007). One example might be to model the decision making of parents in relation to engaging in a case conference where there is a possibility that their child might be returned home from state care. The value placed by the parents on family life (image one) may underpin life goals about enjoyment of their children growing up and family activities (image two), and hence underpin tactical decisions (image three) about engaging with a case conference. Another example might be where a social worker has a role in assisting a young adult with a disability seeking some form of increased independence, where the discussion might be more effective in clarifying the individual’s decision process (and understanding of factors involved) by utilising the image model (Taylor & McKeown, in press).

Explanation Based Decision Theory
Explanation based decision theory focuses on the process of making a coherent explanation (causal model, narrative, account) of the situation on which to make a decision. This model developed by Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie (1989) typically uses flow charts and causal event chains. The decision maker constructs the set of options from which the choice will be made and undertakes a process of cognitive mapping to link the constructed explanations with alternatives. A key aspect of the model is confidence in the decision, considered in terms of goodness-of-fit between explanation and proposed action and coherence (plausibility, completeness and consistency) of the explanation.





This paper has outlined some major models of decision making relevant to developing research in social work. A wide range of models has been covered although some, such as prospect theory, analytic hierarchy process, information integration theory, recognition-primed decision making and the conflict-constraints model, have been omitted for reasons of space. Although direct comparisons between models have been sparing, the models have been presented in their approximate place along an established continuum to aid understanding and analysis.

All modelling involves a simplification of reality in order to better understand the essential mechanisms. For example image theory might be regarded as a rather monolithic model of self-awareness. Application of such models to social work judgements and decisions may require that we temporarily suspend consideration of some of the complexities in order to better understand the essentials first. As a profession we have made some progress in considering possible biases in our reflective practice, as noted above. The time has come to include more explicit use of models to prompt our reflection so as to develop practice, and also to use theoretical models within research on this topic. The improvement of social work decision making in the UK has often been approached from the perspective of prescribing processes for comprehensive data gathering (Munro, 2011). What is required is more attention to supporting the analysis of data within individual judgements and decision making, perhaps through the use of decision models such as presented here.

Prescriptive models of decision making start from a principle of rational choice, which can be conceptualised as the behaviour of an ideal person (Hogarth, 1980). The essential principles are that a person is capable of expressing consistent preferences (value choices) between outcomes (even if these differ from preferences of others) and consistent predictions about their estimate of the likelihood of particular outcomes (even if these contain error by objective standards). This is a useful approach for modelling how we ought to make decisions, given the explicit premises, particularly if we wish to create a decision support system to guide decision makers in their judgements. Empirical research on decision making in other fields has identified various points at which rational approaches are not always followed in practice, and such models are increasingly being fine-tuned to reflect reality more closely. In a societal blame culture where professionals can feel pushed towards more mathematical models of decision making, the limitations of such models need to be recognized explicitly. The balancing of benefits and harms within Subjective Expected Utility has potential within such situations as supporting an older person leaving hospital who is weighing up care options. Signal detection theory will be valuable if we are to develop the prediction of harm (whether abuse, homicide, suicide or neglect) as an aspect of assessment. The rational combination of factors used in judgement analysis may be further ahead in terms of modeling the analysis stage of social work assessment, but provides a useful framework if this is being done quantitatively. Brearley’s work in the realm of fuzzy set theory is broad enough to enable usage in a wide variety of social work contexts.

Descriptive approaches start from looking at how individuals make decisions in the real world. Models are gradually being created that provide insights into how people make decisions in specific contexts. In will be valuable for theorizing social work decision making if we can find insights into such aspects as the place of memory and vividness of information; how we create pattern and meaning out of diverse and conflicting narratives; and how we use imagination to visualize possible responses and scenarios such as what if, and what if we don’t (Byrne, 2005). The challenge is to develop models into a sufficiently transferable, valid and useful form to improve decision making. Given the paucity of robust research on decision making in social work, the theoretical models described here are likely to be used descriptively rather than prescriptively at present. The application to decision making of the traditional social work strengths of supervision and reflective practice might be clarified through consideration of the developments in understanding heuristics and biases. Bounded rationality approaches are little explored as yet but must have application given the time and resources constraints under which social workers usually operate. Explanation based approaches will appeal to social workers where conflicting and contested information must be analyzed given their narrative (and sometimes visual) approach.

Social work operates within a complex environment where systems contain inter-related parts with feedback loops, and chains of cause-and-effect that are not linear (Frensch & Funke, 1995; Munro, 2010). The interactions of the various parts are not always transparent or straightforward to describe. Decisions are constructed through various processes and the above models vary in the extent to which they address the conceptualization of what the decision is (Simon & Newell, 1971). Client needs are considered in the context of family dynamics, resources, statutory responsibilities, risk of harm, standards, policies, procedures and values (Healy, 2003; Spratt, 2000; Stanford, 2008; Taylor, 2006b). It might seem eminently rational and straightforward to model the use of robust knowledge (for example from systematic reviews of the best research) to inform practice decisions (Taylor et al, 2007; Gambrill, 2010). However the application of this approach may be limited (for example to decisions that are clearly about selecting a helping intervention rather than about safeguarding) given the complexities of practice (Killick & Taylor, 2009; Morago, 2006; Scourfield & Pithouse, 2006). It may be that in social work more than one model may be applicable in a particular situation or that an adapted or hybrid model is required in order to help to clarify complex issues.

Most studies of decision making in social work have been small-scale, atheoretical studies (Taylor & Killick, 2011). Further development requires a theoretical underpinning to stimulate fertilization of ideas and concepts. Studies of decision making might be strengthened if the data were analysed in relation to an appropriate model from which hypotheses might be drawn. These could be tested in further studies, perhaps in a different practice context. For example a study using vignettes regarding whether scenarios should be referred for adult protection investigation revealed a substantial number of social workers who followed the organization requirement of mandatory reporting, and a similarly substantial number of social workers who exercised a judgement about reporting at low intensity or frequency of actions defined as abusive in the organizational policy (Killick and Taylor, 2012). The anticipated service response also influenced their judgement. How are we going to make sense of these findings as rational, purposeful behaviour by the decision makers? 

A number of the above models offer potential for use in understanding better defined types of social work decisions. There are a number of models regarding choice between options (such as might be the case in care planning or selecting interventions) although there are few models that address adequately judgements against a threshold, such as in child and adult protection (Jones, 1996) or service eligibility decisions. There are also models focusing on how we develop our skills in decision making (Klein, 1996) and in relation to group decision processes that are beyond the scope of this paper. The development of innovative research on social work decision making now requires the development or adaptation of theoretical models. This is a good example of where interdisciplinarity, particularly involving the disciplines of mathematics and psychology, might benefit social work research echoing major themes of this first European Conference for Social Work Research.

Research on professional judgement in social work needs to develop a theoretical basis to underpin empirical studies. Such a theoretical base could draw on, develop and perhaps combine models presented here, adapted to the complex environments in which we practice and the varying types of decisions. As models are considered in terms of their value in informing social work research, teaching and practice they will no doubt be adapted to the benefit of the wider world of decision research as well as for the advancement of our profession and the benefit of our clients and families.
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